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Abstract
This paper reviews what is known about Soviet management incentive problems
by analyzing the structure and performance of recent success indicators. The
purpose of the paper is to facilitate the development of a questionnaire to
administer to former Soviet enterprise management personnel. Such a question-
naire will enable us to determine the impact of recent reforms on the specifi-
cation and performance of enterprise management success criteria. Furthermore,
information gained from this project will shed additional light on enterprise-
level technological innovation processes because the decision to innovate or
adopt innovations is largely determined by the bonus structure. These two
aspects of the management interview project are part of a larger study of the
Soviet economic bureaucracy which focuses on the organization and operation of
the industrial enterprise.
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Success Indicators and Soviet Enterprise Performance
Success indicators are measures of enterprise performance which are used to
determine management bonuses in Soviet enterprises and production associations.
They act to influence managerial behavior with respect to gross output, produc-
tion expenditures, product mix, input utilization, sales, and quality. Sub-
stantial effort has been directed toward devising success indicators or incen-
tive schemes which i) induce firms to act efficiently in carrying out plans,
ii) motivate managers to send accurate information to central planners, and
iii) place a minimal administrative burden on central planners. In spite of
several reforms since 1965 which directly addressed success indicator issues,
however, there still exists an incentive problem in the USSR. That is, enter-
prise managers are not motivated to produce efficiently or transmit accurate
information regarding productive capacity.
This paper reviews what is known about Soviet management incentive problems
by analyzing the structure and performance of recent success indicators. The
purpose of the paper is to facilitate the development of a questionnaire to
administer to former Soviet enterprise management personnel. Such a question-
naire will enable us to determine the impact of recent reforms on the specifi-
cation and performance of enterprise management success criteria. Furthermore,
information gained from this project will shed additional light on enterprise-
level technological innovation processes because the decision to innovate or
adopt innovations is largely determined by the bonus structure. These two
aspects of the management interview project are part of a larger study of the
Soviet economic bureaucracy which focuses on the organization and operation of
the industrial enterprise.
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Part I identifies what is generally known about Soviet success indicators
by examining various bonus structures, the economic environment in the USSR of
taut planning and input supply uncertainty, and the dysfunctional managerial
behavior resulting from these factors. Reforms introduced in 1965, 1971, and
1979 have all addressed the dysfunctional aspect of managerial behavior by
adopting new success criteria. These are analyzed in Part I in light of the
proposed and actual impact on enterprise-level decision-making. Part II ex-
amines several theoretical models proposed by Western economists to resolve
Soviet success criteria problems. Underlying these models are numerous
hypotheses which may be tested in the course of the enterprise management
interview project. Part III offers a summary of the themes to be stressed in
the management questionnaire.
I. Success Criteria and Managerial Incentive Schemes
Success criteria are rules established by central planning authorities to
determine and evaluate plan fulfillment. In the past, their number has varied,
including such indicators as gross output, sales, production expenditures,
labor or material utilization, and productivity. Incentive systems consist of
reward or bonus structures associated with particular success criteria. Nor-
mally, bonuses are differentiated across success criteria according to planners'
priorities. Soviet enterprise managers are depicted as bonus-maximizers
,
although there is still some debate whether their behavior is short- or long-
run oriented. At any given time, a number of alternative decisions face Soviet
enterprise managers, even under the system of central planning. Planners must
therefore design a set of rules (success criteria) and a system of rewards
(bonus structure) to elicit from enterprise managers those activities and out-
comes consistent with the planners' goals. Indeed, the Soviet incentive
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problem would be eliminated if a set of rules were established which promoted
unity between the interests of central planners and enterprise managers. The
incentive problem stems from a situation where central planners rely on
enterprise managers to supply complete and accurate information regarding pro-
duction capabilities. Enterprise managers in turn are evaluated on the basis
of production performance and, depending upon the success criteria and bonus
structure, may or may not be motivated to supply accurate information or pro-
duce efficiently.
In addition to success criteria and bonus structures, managerial decision-
making is affected by two distinct aspects of the Soviet economy: "taut"
planning and input supply uncertainty. This section analyzes the impact these
two conditions, combined with the set of rules and rewards, have on enterprise
management behavior. As will be demonstrated, this scenario has important con-
sequences for technological innovation at the enterprise level.
The combination of taut planning and perpetual shortage of supplies con-
stitutes the most salient facts of life for Soviet enterprise managers. The
economic implications of taut planning have been analyzed by numerous authors,
most notably Berliner (1957, 1976), Levine (1959, 1974), and Portes (1969).
Linz and Martin (1982) have developed a model designed to examine the combined
effect of taut planning and uncertain input supply on the behavior of the
Planning is said to be taut (Portes 1969, p. 208) when input allocations
are less than or equal to the optimal amounts of the inputs that would be
chosen, given the minimum profit plan, and when the enterprise cannot obtain
the allocated input from secondary sources, such as the black market. From the
central planners' perspective, tautness is highly desirable in the resource
allocation mechanism since it should prevent hoarding of allocated inputs in
one sector while another sector goes begging for the same input. Combined with
the bonus system, however, taut planning induces enterprise managers to make
certain types of decisions that are contrary to the interest of central plan-
ners.
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enterprise manager in the planning-production process. Our results imply that
Soviet enterprise managers, regardless of attitudes toward risk, request larger
quantities of the centrally allocated input under conditions of taut planning
and supply uncertainty than they actually require to produce the targeted level
of output. As a result, resource allocation is distorted as Soviet managers
attempt to ensure a "safety factor" and production is often impeded as bottle-
necks arise in response to supply shortages. Bergson (1964), Berliner (1957,
1976), Feiwel (1965), and Kornai (1959, 1980) cite a number of economic con-
sequences that aggravate the problem of scarcity of the controlled input and
further complicate resource allocation and production under input-supply uncer—
2
tainty. These include stoppages and fluctuations of production, lower stan-
dards of quality, production of unplanned products, falsification of reports,
and employing expeditors (tolkachi ) to supply the enterprise with materials at
any cost, legal or otherwise.
An important component underlying managerial response to these two aspects
of the Soviet economic environment are the success criteria and bonus struc-
tures established by central planning authorities to determine and evaluate
plan fulfillment. The most widely used incentive structure is one in which
quotas are set by central planners for production agents (firms or managers)
and the agents' rewards are based on fulfillment or overfulfillment of these
quotas. Pre 1965 reform quota-bonus incentive schemes have been modeled by
Ames (1965) and Ellman (1971). These reward functions specified that each
manager received i) a base wage, ii) a lump-sum bonus for fulfilling the quota,
2
Production smoothing under a system of centrally allocated inputs can be a
very difficult task, as delays in delivery of critical allocated inputs can
cause unscheduled work stoppages. Berliner (1957) estimates that such delays
in delivery amount to 30% of all work stoppages.
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and iii) an incremental bonus for quota overfulfillment. As modeled by Ames,
the enterprise manager was only constrained to cover production costs, hence
the firm could produce any output such that P > ATC. Under this scheme, agents
maximized their rewards by producing the largest feasible output. Although
this scheme appears to be output-maximizing, it did not motivate managers to
transmit accurate information. Rather, this quota-bonus scheme acted as a pre-
vailing motivation for managers to understate their true productive capacity
because bonuses were paid only if production targets were overfulfilled. If
the manager honestly reported full production capacity, and something went
wrong which halted production, all managerial personnel (and workers) lost the
month's bonus. It was much safer therefore to report a smaller capacity to
4
keep production targets low enough to allow for emergencies. As a consequence,
under pre 1965-reform incentive schemes, planners were never sure plans were
based on accurate information. Planner reaction to perceived inaccurate infor-
mation from enterprise managers was to set arbitrarily high plan targets to
force firms to operate as close to capacity as possible. The extent to which
deliberate overplanning is still practiced needs to be investigated.
3
In this case the reward function can be written as
R, - W, , if X. < ¥,
i i i i
= W, + B. + b(X. - X. ), if X. > T.
i l l l * l i
_where R^ = reward for firm i, Wj_ = base wage, Xj_ current production,
Xi quota/ targeted production, B^ = lump-sura bonus for quota fulfillment,
and b = incremental bonus coefficient for overfulf illment.
4
Indeed, Ames (1965) demonstrates that existing incentive structures were
not optimal because managers could always benefit by transmitting inaccurate
information, i.e., by misrepresenting production capacities.
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The 1965 reforms did little to change the quota-bonus structure of existing
incentive schemes. Rather, success criteria adjustments were made by substi-
tuting probability or sales for gross output as measures of plan fulfillment.
An excellent discussion of the 1965 economic reforms is found in Gregory and
Stuart (1981). Ellman (1971) provides an algebraic characterization of the
bonus formulas incorporated in the 1965 reforms. Overall, the 1965 reform was
unsuccessful in specifying success criteria which motivated managers to trans-
mit accurate information and produce efficiently. The dysfunctional behavior
described by Berliner, Kornai, and others remained the norm.
Post 1965 reform incentive structures have been modelled by Bonin (1976),
Ellman (1973), Weitzman (1976), Loeb and Magat (1978) and others. Weitzman
offers the most general formulation of the success indicators utilized in the
1971 reform. The elicitation scheme described by Weitzman differs from quota-
bonus schemes in at least two respects. Under the post 1971 elicitation incen-
tive structure, forecasts, or self-imposed quotas, are submitted by enterprise
managers to central planners and this expected output information is trans-
mitted on the basis of some planner-specified probability.
To put the 1971 reform and the success indicator issue into perspective, it
is useful to initially consider the planning-production process as a three-
stage static problem. In stage 1, the period of early negotiation and plan
formulation, central planners assign to each firm a tentative output target,
q , and a bonus target, B. The firm is also faced with bonus/penalty coef-
ficients, a, 3, Y» where < a < 3 < Y« In the second stage, the actual
Loeb and Magat (1978) demonstrate that the success indicators modelled by
Ellman (1973) and Fan (1975) are subsets of the Weitzman formulation.
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planning stage, each firm chooses a plan target based on its forecasted output
level, q . The firm's forecasted target need not equal the initial plan target
chosen by the planners. In Stage 3, the period of plan implementation or pro-
duction, the enterprise produces some level of output, q (not necessarily
equal to its forcast, q ), and is rewarded on the basis of a success indicator:
S(q f
,q
a
) = B + (e-Y)q
f
+ Yq*. if q* < q
f
f a .„ a v f
= B + (S-a)q + aq3 , if q
3
> q
f a
where S = total bonus received, q = forecasted output level, q = actual out-
6put level, B = lump-sum bonus and < a < 3 < Y» Within the static framework,
managers are assumed to maximize the current bonus derived from the success
indicator and central planners to adjust the bonus/penalty coefficients to
induce managers to report output levels achievable with some pre-specified
degree of reliability.
In a dynamic framework, planners are assumed to use current performance to
revise the bonus/penalty coefficients (a, $, y) of future success indicators
and managers to maximize the time-discounted sum of current and future bonus
values. It is possible to analyze the "ratchet effect" problem inherent in pre
1971 success indicators within the dynamic framework. That is, if q exceeds
Alternatively, this component of the bonus may be interpreted as incor-
porating the early negotiation stage and written as
B = "B + 3(q
f
-q°)
where B = bonus target and q planners' tentative output target. In this
case the success indicator would be written as:
S(q ,q ) = B + o(q - q ) , if q > q
= B - Y(q - q ), if q < q .
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qf in any given period, planners will increase q in the next period as a
penalty for excessive overfulf illment , thereby obliging firms raise their own
forecasts (although not necessarily by an identical amount), and making it hard
to earn bonuses in following periods.
An important aspect of the 1971 reform was the attempt to eliminate the
ratchet effect. Indeed, the reform froze planner-determined output and bonus
targets for 5 years, and similarly constrained bonus/penalty coefficients for
the same period. As a result, the success indicator, S, is respecified as:
S(qf ,q
a
) = T+ 6(qf - q°) + a(qa - qf ) , if q* > qf
= ¥+ g(qf - q°) + T (qf - qa ) , if q* < qf
where B > 0, q > and < a < $ < y« In this scheme where q affects S but
not necessarily q (i.e., firm forecasts do not influence input allocations)
and if perfect certainty about production is assumed, then firms are motivated
to send truthful information to central planners. That is, they will transmit
accurate forecasts because they are in no way penalized by sending accurate
information and, in fact, can only benefit from doing so under this success
indicator specification. In addition, managers will strive to increase actual
output as much as possible so as to maximize their bonus.
The problem with this success indicator is that it neither allows nor
explains how q affects planning decisions or supply allocations, especially
when more than one enterprise is considered. In the usual case, an individual
firm's forecast, q , affects not only its own capital allocation, k . , but every
other firm's allocation as well, since the total capital available, K, is fixed
during any given period. One would suspect that in this case, managers may
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tend to arbitrarily boost their forecast, q. , to increase their capital alloca-
tion, k , thereby allowing for a greater potential increase in actual output,
q , and hence a higher reward or bonus. In short, this success indicator,
under the conditions just described, still motivates managers to provide inac-
curate information to central planners in order to affect their capital and
input allocations. As such, the 1971 reform has not resolved the problem of
designing a rule whereby managers are motivated to send accurate information to
central planners.
A number of Western economists have addressed the theoretical aspects of
the Soviet success indicator issue since the 1971 reform, most notably Keren
(1972), Weitzman (1976), Loeb and Magat (1978), Conn (1979), Miller and
Thornton (1978), Bonin and Marcus (1979), and Holmstrom (1982). These models
and their underlying hypotheses will be examined in Part II. An important
contribution to be made of this aspect of the enterprise management study will
be in testing several of these hypotheses and examining the impact of the 1971
reform on managerial behavior.
The recent (July 1979) reform of success criteria and bonus structures
indicates a failure of the 1971 reform to achieve desired results, that is, to
promote a unity of interests between central planners and enterprise managers.
By all indications, the New Soviet Incentive System adopted in 1971 failed to
motivate managers to supply accurate information or produce efficiently. As a
result, the 1979 decree specified three new success criteria as the basis for
evaluating enterprise plan/ target fulfillment: i) labor productivity, ii)
quality mix, and iii) fulfillment of delivery plans according to supply
contracts. Three other modifications of the planning process were also
included in the recent decree: i) using "normative net output" instead of
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gross output or sales; ii) continuing (a modified version of) the system of
counter-planning introduced in 1971; iii) assessing plan fulfillment on a
cumulative basis over each year, so that if a firm experiences underfulfillment
in any given quarter, it can be "made up for" in a later quarter, Hanson
(1983) offers an excellent discussion of how these success criteria and
planning changes are supposed to work and the problems inherent in the changes.
While it will not be possible to question former management personnel specifi-
cally about the 1979 reforms (most respondents arrived shortly before or after
the decree was announced), it will be possible to address general issues in-
volved in the reform. For example, questions may be included regarding i) enter-
prise self-assessment of output quality, ii) manager evaluation of "net norma-
tive output" as an improved measure of plan fulfillment, iii) the use of cumu-
lative assessment as a means of reducing incentives to hoard "hidden reserves"
or increasing incentives for improved maintenance and/or retooling. Clearly,
these (and other similar) questions could only be pursued successfully if the
respondent was familiar with the decree. The principle of counter-planning,
o
however, is an area where significant gains in information can be made. To
Under the 1971 system of counter-planning, each firm received stable
Five-Year Plan targets for each year. The firms were then invited to set new,
higher annual targets to increase their bonuses higher than originally spe-
cified.
Q
Counter-planning was adopted in 1971 to overcome tendency to hoard hidden
reserves. Under counter-planning, the enterprise stands to gain a larger
annual bonus by volunteering and fulfilling a higher counter-plan in any given
year than it would by not adopting a counter-plan and simply overfulfilling its
basic plan sufficiently to arrive at the hypothetical counter-plan performance
level. Counterplanning has desirable incentive properties, even under con-
ditions of uncertainty (as Weitzman, 1976, has demonstrated). If the counter-
plan affects the firm's input allocation, however, these desirable incentive
properties are lost. It will, therefore, be important to determine from this
study which is the case.
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what extent did counter-planning affect output levels? How often were counter-
plans submitted? Did counter-plans always involve higher targets?
Taut planning, uncertain input supply, success criteria and bonus struc-
tures are important factors influencing Soviet managerial decision-making. One
area where this is especially pronounced is with respect to enterprise-level
innovation processes. On the one hand, the absence of rational changes for the
use of capital motivates Soviet managers to over-order fixed capital and hoard
machinery and equipment. On the other hand, management incentive systems have
discouraged enterprise directors from taking risks associated with tech-
nological (as opposed to organizational) innovation, or the introduction of
new, large-scale production techniques. This phenomenon is well documented by
Berliner (1976), Amann and Cooper (1982) and others. An important contribution
to be made by this study involves a comparison of their findings (based on
information derived from "priority" industries) with information generated on
the basis of interviews with managers from "non-priority" industries. Are
these managers faced with similar planning and supply problems, and a similar
reward structure to act against technological innovation? Are smaller scale
enterprises more likely to innovate, despite the absence of direct pressure to
do so from above?
II. Modeling Success Indicators and Mangerial Behavior
The incentive problem in the USSR can be likened to a game in which firms
are motivated by success indicators to play strategies consisting of forecasts
(information supplied to central planners) and operating decisions. The
question currently facing Soviet authorities is whether recently designed suc-
cess indicators continue to encourage the transmittal of inaccurate information
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as suggested in Part I. Success indicators have been modeled by Ellman (1971,
1973), Weitzraan (1976), Loeb and Magat (1978), Miller and Thornton (1978) and
others. This section will examine a variety of the success indicator models
and their implementations for Soviet planning and production practices.
An easy way to categorize the numerous recent success indicator models
involves enterprise involvement in the planning process. Most of the models
assume that the firm's actions (forecasts, or counter-plans) have no direct
bearing on input allocations. See, for example, Miller and Thornton (1978),
Conn (1979), Bonin and Marcus (1979), and Weitzman (1976). Loeb and Magat
(1978) allow for enterprise involvement in the planning process by proposing an
"incentive compatible" success indicator which purports to motivate enterprise
managers to transmit accurate information and undertake efficient production
behavior, i.e., their model solves the Soviet incentive problem. The enter-
prise management study has the potential to contribute significantly to this
literature by examining the extent of enterprise involvement in the planning
process. In addition, it will be possible to include questions regarding mana-
gerial effort and output levels to test some of the hypotheses implicit in
Miller and Thornton, and Bonin and Marcus.
Since the primary distinguishing feature of these success indicator models
involves the role of the enterprise in the planning process, it will be useful
to first examine this aspect of the planning-production process. To do so, the
incentive compatible model is presented in an intuitive manner.
Assume first that central planners use the firm's forecasts, q., to alio-
cate available capital, EC. Clearly q = f(k. ,1 ), and if a corresponding sue-
cess indicator is designed such that the bonus increases as q increases, firms
will want to maximize q . Secondly, assume that planners allocate K by
-13-
n
f
selecting k. , k„, ... k to maximize Z q.(k.), where n = the number of firms
and k. < K, k, > 0. In effect, the individual firm's capital allocation, k,
,
1 i r i'
* Fdepends upon all of the enterprises forecasts, k = k (q ), where
F F f f f
q = q (q. , q ? , .. • , q ) . In this case, the corresponding success indicator
would appear to suggest that managers receive bonuses on the basis of actual
output, but actual output depends upon the firm's capital allocation which in
turn depends upon the enterprise's forecast. In fact, the appropriate success
indicator is a function of both forecasted and actual output levels. To
clarify this point, consider only those success criteria which are increasing
in q . The problem then is to chose an optimal success indicator, S, remem-
bering that we are first considering the case where the firm has perfect
knowledge over q , and is rewarded solely on the basis of the success indica-
tor. The optimal success indicator should be designed so as to motivate the
firm to send q. as its forecast (making S "message desirable"), and should
allow for the bonus to increase as actual output increases (making S
"operationally desirable"). If both parts hold, the firm cannot independently
gain by reporting inaccurate information (i.e., sending incorrect forecasts).
The success indicators modelled by Ellman, Weitzraan and others, however,
allow for the individual firm to gain by sending biased information because the
f ahigher q
.
, the greater k. , and hence potential q.. Moreover, as it currently
stands, central planners have no way of finding out whether inaccurate infor-
mation is being transmitted. Loeb and Magat therefore apply the incentive com-
patible literature to the Soviet success indicator problem to overcome the
-14-
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shortcomings inherent in the existing rules. The incentive compatible success
indicator is specified as
S.(q^qF ) - q*(k.) + 2 q^(k\) - A.
F —
where k, , k^, • ••> k are determined on the basis of q , K is allocated to
F f
maximize q , and where A. depends upon every other firm's q . In essence, the
success indicator awards a bonus to firm i on the basis of realized or actual
output, plus the sum of all firms' forecasted output levels, minus some lump-
sum amount. To understand why the incentive compatible success indicator is
deemed superior, it is necessary to understand the role that A. plays in the
indicator.
A graphic interpretation of the incentive compatible success indicator is
given in Figure 1. Assume there are only two managers, i and j. Manager i's
actual output function q. is assumed to be the same as manager j's forecasted
9
Incentive compatible success indicators have the following three
properties: (a) there exists a centralized decision-making mechanism (_e.g.,
the CPB) which determines how some commodity (e.g., the capital stock, K)
is going to be allocated among a set of consumers or producers (e.g., plant
managers) so as to maximize reported net benefits (e.g., forecasted output);
(b) the centralized mechanism then transfers to each agent (firm/manager) the
reported net benefits of all others given the allocated quantities (e.g., in
this case, the total output forecasted by all j managers is added to manager
i's success indicator); and (c) each agent (firm/manager) is then taxed (or
subsidized) in a lump-sum fashion, an amount which is calculated independently
of the agent's own actions.
Of the three properties above, property (a) is the most important. It is
this property which ensures that the dominant strategy of each agent is to
reveal information truthfully. In most cases, however, an incentive compatible
scheme of this sort will result in a particular pattern of income distribution
which may be deemed "inequitable" (because of property b) . Hence, property c
is really a device to redistribute income, and can be set up in an arbitrary
manner. Since this redistributive device is administrered in a lump-sum
fashion, it cannot possibly affect an}r agent's strategic decision-making. In
this sense, property c may be viewed as not an inherent part of any incentive
compatible scheme.
q j
' s^~~ '
<T
Aj
\g
H
~— q?
T F<"
W-
FIGURE
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output function, q. (this assumption does not in any way affect the generality
of the analysis, it is made for graphical convenience). The total available
capital stock is OK. If the entire amount is allocated to i, actual output
from i would be HK. The forecasted output function of j is drawn using K as
the origin, so that if the entire OK is allocated to j , OG would be the fore-
f a
casted output from j. By assumption, q and q are identical, hence OG KH.
Suppose i reveals truthfully its output function (i.e., it reports q as its
forecast function to the central planners), then the CPB would allocate capital
a f
by maximizing q = q.,(k. ) + q.(k.). Graphically, the total output function can
f abe gotten by vertically adding the q and q curves, so it must begin at G and
end at H, reaching a maximum (point R) directly above the intersection (pointfa f
Q) of the q. and q curves. This holds because at Q the slopes of q and
q are equal. Clearly the solution for the planners is to allocate OT of capi-
tal to i and KT to j. Note that, by construction, OT - KT, so that the entire
capital stock is equally divided between the two managers.
The incentive compatible structure then defines the success indicator for i
as
a f
S
i
= h + «j - Ai
where A. is the maximum of q.. It is obvious from the diagram that
i j
a f
q = QT, q. = QT, and A = OG. Hence
S - QT + QT - QG
- RT - QG
= RT - VT
= RV.
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What is the economic interpretation of RV? It is the social opportunity
cost of not having i, because had i been absent, the entire capital stock would
have been allocated to j and the resultant total output would have only been
OG. RV measures the net contribution from i. Hence, by defining A. in the
particular way above, the success indicator directly measures the net social
contribution of a manager.
The above analysis was carried out under the assumption that i reports
truthfully q. . Is there an incentive for him to do so? The answer is clearly
yes, because revealing q. is his dominant strategy—no other strategy would
f a
make him better off. To see this, suppose i reports q which is above q ,
f a fi.e., q > q.. Figure 2 reproduces the first graph and includes the q. curve.
The reported or forecasted total output function must now start at G, end at W,
lie everywhere above the old one, and reach a maximum to the right of R, say at
R'. Note again that R' must be directly above the points of equal slopes on
the q. and q. curves (points A and B respectively). Central planners base
f ftheir capital allocation decision on q. and q.. Hence OT' amount of capital is
allocated to i this time with only K f allocated to j . As a result, i's action
of overforecasting causes more capital to be allocated to him. However, this
actually makes him worse off than before. To see this, note that with OT 1
amount of capital i's actual output is Q'T' , while j's forecasted output is
BT f . In this case, i's success indicator is
S. = q? + q^ - A.
l i J i
= Q'T' + BT' - OG
= IT' - OG
= IT' - JT'
= IJ
and IJ < RV.
KFIGURE 2
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Similar analysis will show that if i underforecasts his output, he will again
be worse off than if he reveals truthfully q .
It should be clear that the incentive for i to reveal q. truthfully is not
altered even if A is defined differently (although A. must remain a lump-sum
configuration and independent of i's action). For if we now define A. * OG,
St
but A. 0G' , we see that if i reveals q
.
, his success indicator would be RV':
1 i '
but if he reports q , his success indicator would be IJ 1 , and IJ' is less than
RV'
,
so he is again worse off by overforecasting. Of course, if A is defined
by OG' and not OG, the nice interpretation of the success indicator (i.e., that
it measures the opportunity cost of not having the manager or the net contribu-
tion of the manager) is lost, but by no means has the incentive to reveal
truthfully one's output changed. For this reason A. can be defined arbitrarily
as Loeb and Magat state (p. 179), but obviously it is better to define it in
such a way so as the resultant indicator (or index) has some clear economic
meaning.
If problems associated with defining A. were resolved, this incentive com-
patible success indicator would represent, theoretically at least, an improve-
ment over those currently employed in the USSR. It relies, however, on the
assumption that firms, after receiving their capital allocations, employ opti-
mizing quantities of labor and other materials. This assumption fails to take
into account Soviet employment practices whereby labor is rarely removed from
the production process and hence not always employed in optimizing quantities.
It will be useful to determine from this study the extent to which these
employment policies persist, given labor shortages in most sectors of the
Soviet economy.
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Miller and Thornton (1978) criticize the applicability of Loeb and Magat's
incentive compatible bonus structure in the USSR. Their analysis of the post
1971 incentive system incorporates the effect of managerial effort on output.
The applicability and usefulness of their model is contingent upon answers to
at least three questions: i) can and do Soviet managers affect input alloca-
tions? ii) is the ratchet effect weak or strong? iii) does managerial effort
vary significantly when central planners change bonus/penalty coefficients in
reward structures? In addition, we need to know more about the nature of the
uncertainty faced by Soviet enterprise management, and about the relationship
between managerial effort and output.
III. Management Questionnaire Themes
The primary role of the Soviet Economic Bureaucracy (SEB) project is to
contribute to the descriptive literature on the structure and performance of
the Soviet economy by updating and perhaps revising our current knowledge of
how the Soviet economy operates. Of fundamental importance to the SEB project
is a special study of the Soviet enterprise, how it operates and what it is
like to run a Soviet firm. A study of this sort will enhance our understanding
of the Soviet economy by confronting a variety of planning, production, and
distribution issues. Interviewing former Soviet management personnel, plan-
ners, and party officials, as expert-informants, will enable us to gain an
understanding of how the Soviet economic bureaucracy worked in the 1960s and
1970s, and if, how, when, and why it has changed over time.
Keren (1972) was the first to address the impact of managerial effort on
output. In Keren's model, effort affects output by increasing the quality of
managerial decisions.
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The Soviet enterprise management study incorporates four basic themes:
enterprise-ministry relations, innovation and the enterprise, management-labor
relations, and managerial motivation and evaluation. To facilitate the de-
velopment of a questionnaire to be administered to former enterprise management
personnel, working papers have been written which review and summarize what
is known with confidence, what we think we know, and what is not known about
contemporary Soviet enterprise organization and operation. In these working
papers, the formal structure of the management system is identified, management
practices at the macro- and microeconoraic levels are examined, and the impact
of the reforms implemented in the 1960s and 1970s on the structure and pro-
cesses of the management system is analyzed in light of the basic themes this
study is investigating. In addition, Soviet management incentive issues are
explored in some detail; first to determine the effects of recent reforms on
the specification and performance of enterprise management success criteria;
and second, to gain additional insight into enterprise-level innovation pro-
cesses, because the decision to innovate or adopt innovations in the USSR is
largely determined by the bonus structure. In each working paper, where
appropriate, hypotheses and questions are identified for possible inclusion In
the enterprise management questionnaire.
See also, Susan J. Linz, "Soviet Enterprise and the Management
Environment: A Review Essay," Working Paper 14-83, Department of Economics,
LSU, August 1983.
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